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 Regulating the 
Medium: Reactions 
to Network 
Neutrality in the 
European Union 
and Canada 
 By Daithí Mac Síthigh 
 T
he complex issue of “network neutrality” is difficult 
to separate from a range of market, cultural, and 
technological debates, with possible legislative 
and administrative action under consideration in 
the United States, Canada, and the European Union. 
Academic interest, as is often the case, pre-dated polit-
ical discussions, with a strong US focus over the course 
of the last decade, including Wu’ early definition of the 
issue, while Lessig’s 2001  The Future of Ideas , mostly 
concerned with copyright and related issues, gave 
some space to the issue that we now recognize as part 
of net neutrality. 1 However, the topic has, in the period 
between these early warnings and the time of writing, 
become one of the most recognizable controversies in 
the policy and law of Internet media, 2 and the subject 
of detailed studies. 3 It has a particularly high profile 
in the United States, being the subject of regular 
pronouncements by presidential candidates during the 
2008 campaign, not to mention numerous unsuccess-
ful legislative proposals. 4 More recently, one particular 
FCC action was reviewed by the DC Circuit Court of 
Appeal, 5 and the Commission published in December 
2010 its report and order,  Preserving the Open Internet: 
Broadband Industry Practices , after a lengthy consulta-
tion process. 6 The well-known issue is that of whether 
providers of Internet connectivity to consumers and 
others ( i.e. , broadband providers, whether “traditional” 
standalone Internet Service Providers (ISPs), cable 
companies, or other) should be prevented from restrict-
ing or differentiating the services and content available 
to end users. 
 While the debate is conducted at various levels, 
and there are differing definitions of what exactly 
is being proposed or opposed, those who favor legal 
support for net neutrality argue that the State should 
prevent ISPs from restricting the content received by 
subscribers or favoring content providers. Opponents 
typically fall into two camps: (1) those who argue that 
legislation is unnecessary as consumer and/or eco-
nomic behavior will prevent abuse and (2) those who 
argue that the ISP should be able to act in this way as 
a matter of its own discretion to provide services to 
consumers as it sees fit. Normally, the ISPs will argue 
that supporting high-bandwidth content is resource-
 intensive, although claims that the Internet is close to 
the breaking point are overstated, with capacity grow-
ing at or slightly ahead of the same speed as use and 
overall demand falling significantly short of the avail-
able connectivity, with peak utilization of resources 
still under 50 percent. 7 In particular, it is suggested that 
ISPs would, in the absence of an explicit prohibition, 
enter into financial agreements with content provid-
ers (with whom they normally would have no direct 
business relationship) so that the ISP could defray its 
costs and the content provider could be assured that its 
services would be accessible to the ISP’s customers.  
 In this contribution to the growing literature 
on this important topic, the expression-related ele-
ments of net neutrality are considered, including a 
case study of Ireland, highlighting the broad powers 
enjoyed by ISPs, and discussing whether the problem 
is a genuine one. While noting that the matter has 
been the subject of various publications by a sizeable 
number of US scholars, space is then given to com-
paring the state of the debate in Europe, Canada, and 
the United States, drawing on principles of telecom-
munications law. 8 It is argued that the link between 
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 telecommunications and media regulation is at the 
heart of the net neutrality debates in Canada and (to 
a lesser extent) the European Union, and that the 
non-applicability of certain US doctrines in these 
jurisdictions (due to different market conditions and 
the established role of competition law) does not 
mean that regulatory or legislative action is unneces-
sary. Finally, it is contended that the consideration 
of net neutrality in the context of important social 
and political debates regarding speech, plurality, and 
innovation is a better approach than one focused on 
ex post identification of the most egregious examples 
of discriminatory practices.  
 SPEECH AND THE ISP 
 CONTEXT 
 It is immediately clear, though, that a nuanced 
approach to cyberlaw is more necessary than ever, 
if the problems raised are to be analyzed and dealt 
with without hysteria or confusion. In that context, 
given that freedom of expression is a factor within 
the debate, and indeed has, on a number of occasions, 
become a key issue of public interest, it is relevant for 
the purposes of this study. In particular, the role of the 
ISP in controlling the content accessed by users, for 
whatever reason, is a difficult and controversial one. 
It becomes more significant where services and data 
are Web-based and assuming always-on connections, 
and demand for video requires faster and better con-
nectivity. Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that 
Web 2.0 innovation is encouraged by the end-to-end 
principle, therefore suggesting that a modification to 
end-to-end is in practice opposition to this model of 
innovation. 9 
 Within the broader question of pricing for access 
and the rights and wrongs of such a system, advocates 
of net neutrality legislation often point to what are 
argued to be examples of abuse of power by service 
providers as justification for legislative intervention. 
This approach is not dissimilar to the arguments 
regarding web hosts made by the present author and 
by others. 10 So for example, when the pro-choice 
group NARAL was refused permission to use a “short 
code” SMS facility provided by large carrier Verizon, 
this was pointed to as an example of the dangers of 
allowing unregulated service providers to pick and 
choose between content providers, thus regulating, 
in practice, not just the communicative rights of the 
provider but the actual content received by the con-
sumer. 11 To its credit, Verizon Wireless responded and 
said that the policy was out-of-date and reversed its 
decision, but certainly it is apparent that such inci-
dents do not assist the ISPs and telecommunications 
industries in opposing any regulation under the net 
neutrality banner. Before continuing to look at the 
details of the net neutrality debate, then, it is neces-
sary to apply the same analysis to ISP censorship as 
a general principle as the author has done in respect 
of Web 2.0 hosts, though noting that this issue is a 
broader one than net neutrality, despite its influence 
on the perception of the intentions of the ISP. 
 OFFENSIVE SPEECH 
 In order to examine the gap between legal stan-
dards and ISP-driven standards, we note here the 
position of “offensive speech,” which is also appli-
cable, in some regards, to the problems of Web site 
hosts discussed previously. The ISP, though, normally 
starts from a position of greater legal certainty, espe-
cially in jurisdictions where ISPs and hosts are treated 
differently for the purposes of intermediary liability. 
Courts, and not just the US Supreme Court, have 
been at pains to point out that guarantees of freedom 
of expression extend to some speech that may be 
considered offensive. 
 The phrases are familiar to all concerned: in 
the context of challenges to statutory prohibitions 
on the burning of the US flag, Brennan J wrote that 
“if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because soci-
ety finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 12 
Similarly, in the European Court of Human Rights, it 
long has been held that freedom of expression is “one 
of the essential foundations of a [democratic] society” 
and, subject to the restrictions contained in the text 
of the convention, applies not only to information 
and ideas that are “favorably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any 
sector of the population.” 13 
 These resonant phrases are familiar to the student 
of law and frequently are quoted in general or politi-
cal contexts. But compare them with the Verizon rule 
that was at issue in the NARAL controversy:  reserving 
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the right to deny service when the customer “seeks to 
promote an agenda or distribute content that, in its 
discretion, may be seen as controversial or unsavory 
to any of our users.” 14 Another example is the policy 
of AT&T that, before a rapid amendment, banned 
the use of AT&T facilities by customers in a way that 
“tends to damage the name or reputation of AT&T, 
or its parents, affiliates and subsidiaries” 15 (which 
could lead to the immediate termination or suspen-
sion of access), or even the decision of Canadian ISP 
and telecommunications operator Telus to prevent its 
subscribers from accessing the Web site of the trade 
union representing its own workers during an indus-
trial dispute. 16 In all three cases, it is the reservation 
of the right to determine appropriateness that is the 
subject of criticism, particularly when such reserva-
tion is compared with broad claims as to the value of 
offensive speech in judicial approaches to such. 
 By way of a case study outside of the well-
 documented jurisdiction of the United States, 
 consider the case of Ireland, a small jurisdiction, a 
member of the European Union, and a nation with 
strong technology and information industries. Eircom 
is the largest ISP in Ireland, 17 accounting for 60 per-
cent of DSL (broadband) connections. It has two 
versions of a policy on offensive speech. The first has 
been applicable since dial-up connections were avail-
able; the acceptable usage policy (which also applies 
to broadband customers) states that: 
 Customers may not use  eircomnet services to 
create, host or transmit offensive or obscene 
material, or engage in activities, which would 
cause offense to others on the grounds of race, 
creed, or sex. 18 
 The second policy forms a part of the terms of use 
of the broadband service, and appears to reach even 
further than the original policy: 
 Customers may not use the Facility to create, 
host or transmit offensive or obscene material, 
or engage in activities, which are likely to cause 
offence to others on any grounds including, but 
not limited to race, creed, or sex. 19 
 What is of particular concern here is that the 
well-meaning language does appear to go far beyond 
the terms of the legislation applicable in this area, 
the Prohibition on Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989. 
This Irish version of “hate speech” legislation, which 
creates an offense in section 2 of uttering or pub-
lishing statements that  are “threatening, abusive or 
insulting and are intended or, having regard to all the 
circumstances, are likely to stir up hatred,” is of course 
more extensive than what would be constitutionally 
permissible in some jurisdictions. Nonetheless, a 
statement that may not be a violation of applicable 
Irish laws could still be a violation of Eircom’s policy 
and thus not permitted to be “create(d), host(ed) or 
transmit(ted)” via what is, for many users, the only 
effective provider in town; the majority of consumers 
in broadband-enabled areas are using DSL connec-
tions where Eircom is dominant, although there has 
been an increase in alternative methods over the 
recent periods (cable, wireless, etc). 
 In Ireland, there is a textually narrow guarantee 
of freedom of expression. 20 It has led to very few 
successful constitutional challenges, with only one 
statutory provision ever struck down based on this 
article as repugnant to the Constitution (and over 90 
statutes or provisions of statutes have been so struck 
down since 1937), and that was a relatively ancient 
provision relating to begging in the Vagrancy Act. 21 
Things are changing, though. Article 40.6.1(i) has 
been relied on in other cases and in the refusal of 
injunctive relief, and in  Mahon v. Post Publications , 22 
Fennelly J outlined that the courts “do not pass 
judgment on whether any particular exercise of the 
right of freedom of expression is in the public inter-
est” and that no justification other than “freedom of 
expression itself” is necessary. He even noted that the 
pursuit of profit or “less noble motives” did not pose a 
problem for this doctrine. So while the Irish courts are 
extending the protection of freedom of expression, 
removing threats of State intervention, individuals 
must see that freedom filtered through the terms of 
use of a private ISP. This is, to say the least, a mixed 
message regarding the state of speech for Irish new 
media producers. 
 Even with a diversity of providers, the situa-
tion may not change all that much. Certainly, even 
a brief survey indicates that other Irish providers 
have similar policies, with the most successful cable 
ISP, UPC forbidding in its acceptable usage policy 
the “transmission of email to any person contain-
ing offensive or abusive language” and postings that 
contain offensive or abusive language. 23 Geography 
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is quite significant here as, despite Internet-without-
borders rhetoric, the “last mile” even in an advanced-
capitalist, deregulated, democratic state, is typically 
a local wired ISP, wifi hotspot, or mobile broadband 
provider. 24 Furthermore, where policies are adopted 
across the providers in a jurisdiction, there may be 
no choice at all—a convergence or standardization 
of restrictions, perhaps—even though such policies 
typically go beyond the legal requirements in a given 
country according to initial research regarding ISPs in 
Europe and the United States. 25 
 Commercial ISPs are, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
more likely to impose additional restrictions on user 
behavior, even those that initially had few restric-
tions, with AOL being an example of a successful, 
mainstream player that did not restrict “hate speech” 
until 2000. 26 Eircom, too, did for some time defend 
the industry and their users against an even greater 
threat, that of court-ordered mandatory filtering (to 
be carried out by ISPs in accordance with the instruc-
tions of the recording industry) that seems inconsis-
tent with EU law on this matter. Nonetheless, the 
argument made by Eircom in its first responses of the 
filtering challenge (that it is akin to common carriers 
not deserving liability) is potentially weakened by its 
range of activities that are wholly inconsistent with 
the common carrier tradition. 
 REACTIONS 
 In the context of the Verizon dispute discussed 
at the outset of this article, the argument of Yoo, a 
prominent opponent of net neutrality, that govern-
ment should not regulate to solve such a dispute 
(‘[you] might find text-messaging companies compet-
ing on their openness policies’) 27 seems too optimis-
tic. A note of reality is struck by Solove, who suggests 
that, in the context of social networking, relatively 
obscure dispute-handling procedures are rarely a 
consideration for consumers, which therefore cannot 
lead to meaningful competition based on policies. 28 
Indeed, in the United States, over 75 percent of resi-
dential broadband is cable or DSL (just a few years 
ago, it was 90 percent of residential users, although 
the use of mobile telephones with full Internet access 
is now having an impact), and looking at those zip 
codes where one or the other is available, it can be 
observed that between a quarter and half of the dis-
tricts in recent years have had either no  competition 
or a choice between two providers. 29 However, the 
focus of the expression-related debate within net 
neutrality is typically on general interference with 
the free distribution of content, rather than one-off 
decisions to punish customers or disable access to 
content. 
 Recent arguments in the United States have 
included reference to the “First Amendment rights” 
of telecommunications companies as a reason to 
oppose or be skeptical about net neutrality. Along 
similar lines, Sunstein criticized the use of the First 
Amendment by mainstream players in the US televi-
sion industry (in opposing public interest obligations 
for digital television broadcasters) and draws links 
between the use of the First Amendment in this 
context and the use of the Second Amendment (the 
right to bear arms) by the National Rifle Association. 
He concludes that the constitutional arguments are 
invoked “in order to give a veneer of principle and 
respectability to arguments that would otherwise 
seem hopelessly partisan and self-interested.” 30 Of 
course, the pleading of constitutional rights is not 
confined to the purest of the pure (many important 
cases in criminal law, for example, may stem from 
an individual’s desire to be released from prison or 
found not guilty of an offense rather than their com-
mitment to a philosophical concept of liberty), but 
the arguments made by Sunstein and others do serve 
as a reminder to engage in a debate of principle, and 
an analysis of the purpose of freedom of expression 
rather than a purely legalistic approach that could 
indeed come to a sudden conclusion based on par-
ticular understandings of the relevant constitutional 
right. 
 It does seem, on a more practical note, that ISPs 
making such arguments appear to be a little confused 
in their advocacy (as Eircom was in the Irish situa-
tion), as they have argued for many years (and are 
supported by section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act in the United States) that they are 
not “speakers” or “publishers” in the context of 
cases brought against them for content distributed 
via their network. So can they realistically make 
an argument that they have expressive rights in the 
content that they have argued is not “theirs” for many 
years? Similar criticisms have been expressed regard-
ing Google’s apparent dual status as deserving First 
Amendment protection as a speaker and immunity as 
a neutral, algorithm-based intermediary. 31 
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 NETWORK NEUTRALITY—A 
GLOBAL DEBATE? 
 EUROPEAN UNION  
 The debate on net neutrality in Europe was 
somewhat slower in getting underway, although some 
European commentators urged that non-US interests 
follow and play a role in the US debates, as decisions 
made in the United States will have an impact on 
European users. 32 There have been some contro-
versies over ISP behavior, particularly Virgin in the 
United Kingdom, who engage in significant “throt-
tling” (applying artificial bandwidth restrictions to 
heavy users) and are introducing specific restrictions 
on BitTorrent; others such as Plus.net have published 
“priority” policies that set out the status of various 
categories of service (such as “gaming” and “VoIP”), 
though not (yet) specifically branded services. 33 
 To date, the behavior of European ISPs has been 
subject to EU regulation through the various tele-
communications directives (including the Framework 
Directive and the associated directives on Access and 
Interconnection and Universal Service), 34 in par-
ticular those relating to access and interconnection 
that deal explicitly with Internet-related activities. 
Support also is found in Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
could mean that discrimination in favor of a related 
company ( e.g. , in the net neutrality hypothetical of 
an ISP favoring content originating in a subsidiary) 
attracts attention under antitrust law, although this 
has not been tested in a relevant context to date, so 
we must rely on general principles, such as those set 
out in the Commission’s notice on access agreements 
published in 1998. 
 In this statement, three examples are given: 
(1) refusal to grant access to A where it is granted to B, 
(2) refusal to grant access at all (essential facilities) 
and (3) withdrawal of access. 35 The Access Directive 
has a role to play too. In both cases, though, it cannot 
be said for certain that the concepts here are applica-
ble entirely to the conveying of content, 36 especially 
where there is no established market for contractual 
agreements between content providers and ISPs, as 
there can be in conventional disputes within the 
telecommunications industry. Furthermore, there are 
hurdles that must be overcome even in the case of 
the Access Directive, where significant market power 
must be found, and this is far from established in the 
case of ISPs restricting user access to content. The 
main obligations on network providers are to negoti-
ate ( e.g. , for interconnection), though with backstop 
powers for national regulatory authorities in certain 
circumstances. 
 PEERING AND UNBUNDLING 
 Indeed, some commentary discusses the role of 
IP peering and transit arrangements (which are the 
legal relationships that enable, in practice, Internet 
content to flow freely without the need for multiple 
contracts between users and upstream providers) 
in possible situations of discrimination, 37 although 
the connection between the negotiation of these 
arrangements and the regulation of media content 
is not a common one. Notably, the cost of peering 
expressed in terms of MB continues to fall, and it 
is argued by analysts that there has been a shift in 
the relationship between content providers and 
ISPs, challenging the understanding of both sets 
of arrangement. 38 On the other hand, the regula-
tion of satellite and cable TV, including difficult 
issues such as electronic program guides (EPGs) has 
seen substantial regulatory intervention and critical 
comment. 39 Furthermore, we should take care to 
recognize the difference between the regulation of 
Internet service providers under telecommunications 
law in the two jurisdictions. 40 
 In the United States, the FCC’s position can 
be ascertained from a number of sources. In general, 
broadband Internet access is classified as an “infor-
mation service” rather than a “telecommunications 
service” for the purposes of the Communications 
Act, a major restriction on FCC powers. 41 The most 
important test of such is the ruling of the Supreme 
Court in the  Brand X 42 case, which finds that existing 
legislation does not require the Commission to facili-
tate local loop unbundling in the case of cable broad-
band access. Under the approach set out in the earlier 
1980  Computer II decision, the Commission has the 
option to, but is not required to regulate aspects of 
what were then called “enhanced” services. Since 
then, telecommunications operators were required by 
the FCC to provide facilities-based access to others 
in respect of Internet access (which, at the time, was 
essentially dial-up access to the early Internet and 
similar services). Following  Brand X , it did not take 
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long for the Commission to determine, in the 2005 
Wireline Broadband Order, that DSL should be simi-
larly classified as an information service not subject 
to further duties, 43 and this decision was upheld on 
appeal in 2007. 44 
 Telecommunications services, for example, are 
subject to various common carrier requirements 
through mandatory regulation, while information ser-
vices are not. The ultimate goal for the Commission 
is regulating all broadband Internet access services 
in the same way, although the extent of such regu-
lation remains unclear and certainly, the common 
regulation is not as common carriers or anything 
quite like it. 45 On the other hand, initial indications 
are that IPTV is considered to be cable television in 
the United States. In  Office of Consumer Counsel v. 
Southern New England Telephone , 46 AT&T’s service 
was found, on the basis of its primarily one-way char-
acter, to be subject to the Communications Act and 
other provisions. The successful argument was that it 
was necessary for duties and obligations to be shared 
by all providers, and that it would be unjust to allow 
AT&T to perform the functions of a cable TV opera-
tor without being subject to any restrictions. This will 
undoubtedly add a further element to the net neutral-
ity discussions. 47 
 However, the European Union approach includes 
both unbundling and wholesale “bitstream” provisions, 
and the designation of aspects of DSL broadband as 
affected by significant market power is important here. 
This means that there is a diverse range of providers 
of broadband Internet access in many areas, joined by 
access through cable networks (which is not presently 
subject to the access requirements of DSL). This recalls 
the point presented above regarding significant market 
power, meaning that it would be harder to engage 
EU law on this point given the range of providers. 
The optimist would add that this means that there is 
no problem.  
 SEPARATING THE MEDIUM 
AND THE MESSAGE 
 Problems with regard to the lack of system-
wide regulation of European media are relevant 
here. Aspects of European broadcasting law are the 
subject of harmonization (most recently through 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive), with an 
approach rooted in “technological neutrality” now 
being included in legislative instruments, replacing 
earlier versions where the medium of transmission 
was significant for the purposes of regulatory clas-
sification. So while the prospect of an US-style net 
neutrality squabble breaking out at the EU level 
is not a guaranteed one, the ability of the Internet 
media sector to respond to such developments may 
by compromised by the Commission’s perception 
of audiovisual media services as divorced from the 
networks over which they are carried. On the other 
hand, there is a reminder in the Framework Directive, 
albeit in a recital, that the preferred approach of sepa-
rating the regulation of content from the regulation 
of transmission does not “prejudice taking the links 
between them into account.” 
 Indeed, the network neutrality matter has been 
on the table for some time. A 2006 Commission 
consultation on “content online in the single market” 
asserted that “the Internet is currently based on the 
principle of ‘network neutrality,’ with all data moving 
around the system treated equally.” 48 The document 
noted the proposal “being floated” that this could 
change, and asked for responses. Surprisingly, not 
many individuals, business or organizations took up 
this challenge, and those that did (consumer groups, 
software providers, etc.) opposed a change to the 
purported net neutrality principle that presently pre-
vails in Europe. However, the polarization (and con-
sequent focus) of the European stakeholders on the 
question of “whether content should be regulated” 
during the passage of the Audiovisual Media Services 
does pose a threat, in that the questions relating to 
the role of telecommunications and Internet service 
providers may be neglected. There also is the more 
technical, but still important, question of the desig-
nation of markets as relevant for the purposes of EU 
telecommunications law; certainly, there are aspects 
of net neutrality that would not fall within the cur-
rently selected relevant markets and therefore, if the 
matter was to be resolved through the electronic com-
munications framework, further designation could be 
necessary.  
 More recently, Commissioner Reding argued (in 
a 2008 speech) 49 that networks and access are of “cru-
cial importance,” and that neither the Commission 
nor national regulatory authorities would accept abu-
sive or anti-competitive behavior in the area of traffic 
prioritization. However, Reding’s statement should 
be considered as a skeptical view of the  legislative 
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approach, for three reasons. She suggests that the 
debate thus far can be seen as part of disputes between 
ISPs and content providers on financial matters, 
she points to the existing package of “helpful tools” 
in the regulatory framework, and finally (and most 
importantly) in a number of parts of the statement it 
is suggested that consumers and providers will be able 
to determine the fate of this matter: “it will be up to 
the consumers to decide to change to a provider that 
offers them what they would like,” and “if one sup-
plier seeks to restrict user rights, another can enter 
the market with a more ‘open’ offer.” We can see 
here how, even by the standards of the Commission, 
this is identified in the tradition of hands-off  market-
driven telecommunications regulation, and the cul-
tural dimension of network neutrality has not been 
recognized.  
 We can also note, in reading the 2008 com-
munication on future networks (which contains a 
reference to net neutrality), 50 how the Commission 
relies on the very general provisions of the Universal 
Service Directive. Indeed, the Commission’s proposed 
amendments were cast so as to be focused on transpar-
ency rather than full engagement with possible ISP 
misbehavior. 51 The Commission also pointes to what 
are now articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty as prevent-
ing problems from arising in Europe, which again 
suggests a lack of willingness to engage in specific  ex 
ante regulation.  
 In the process of the discussion of the Universal 
Service Directive, a gap appeared to have opened up 
in late 2008 between the European institutions, spe-
cifically relating to article 22 of the Directive, which 
currently deals with quality of service, albeit to a 
very limited extent. The main support comes from 
content providers such as Google, 52 and the opposi-
tion comes from telecommunications operators, 53 
as would be expected, although the Commission 
also has been criticized for paying any attention to 
this issue, which was said to be a distraction from 
the more serious issue of increasing access to the 
Internet in underserved nations, particularly in the 
southern and eastern member states. 54 The issue was 
to what extent the Directive would provide either 
for Commission or national regulatory agencies to set 
minimum requirements, including (as some would 
have it) the prevention of the slowing of traffic or 
the degradation of service. This can be understood 
as an additional element of existing QoS oversight 
and is welcomed (to some extent) by a number of 
parties. 
 However, the most audacious attempt was that 
of the European Parliament, which proposed allow-
ing (or requiring) national regulatory authorities to 
take measures to “ensure that the ability of users to 
access or distribute lawful content or to run lawful 
applications and services of their choice is not rea-
sonably restricted,” or various versions of this. 55 This 
approach, extremely close to the FCC’s articulation 
of broadband policy in the Four Freedoms statement 
and subject to the same sort of caveats, was resisted 
by the Commission. The result was a requirement in 
Directive 2009/138 that national regulatory authori-
ties be able to enforce a minimum quality of service, 
coupled with additional obligations on service provid-
ers regarding transparency or disclosure, but certainly 
not a provision requiring member states to prohibit 
the controversial activities implicated in net neutral-
ity debates. 
 This debate has been joined to one regarding 
whether various forms of action should be permis-
sible by way of supposed sanction for breach of 
copyright (the “three strikes” graduated response that 
has proven controversial in France), with aspects of 
each making their way into the respective bundles 
of amendments. The result of that particular debate 
was a commitment in a single amending Directive 
2009/140 to allowing some restrictions on end-user 
activities, subject to various caveats based on fair 
procedures and fundamental rights. The Commission 
refers to this as an “Internet freedom” provision, but 
its scope has been questioned by some campaigners.  
 Finally, in terms of specific references to net 
neutrality, the matter also became the subject of a 
specific “Declaration” appended to the package of 
legislative changes, noting the importance of the 
“open and neutral character of the Internet,” and 
promising regular monitoring and a report before the 
end of 2010. Although disappointing some by falling 
outside of the formal legal text, the extent of the com-
mitment is still more than might have been imagined 
when net neutrality was, for all intents and purposes, 
a US-specific issue. The European Commission first 
published a questionnaire, 56 and then reported few 
current problems, confidence in existing law, agree-
ment on treating fixed and mobile services alike, but 
some disagreement regarding ‘managed services’. 57 A 
parallel process is underway in the United Kingdom, 
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with regulator Ofcom appearing to focus its energies 
on transparency-type questions, while also seeking 
information on specific examples of discriminatory 
activities, but suggesting that such would only be pres-
ent where an operator with substantial market power 
acted in support of its own activities. 58 As anticipated 
by the Directive, Ofcom does not appear minded to 
prohibit or seriously restrict traffic management. 
 NET NEUTRALITY IN CANADA 
 In Canada, the CRTC also dealt with the net-
work neutrality issue in a fairly serious way, both as 
an aspect of broader policy discussions and in its own 
right. There is little enthusiasm on the part of the 
relevant ministers to enact legislation, although Geist 
argues trenchantly that the position of the major 
Canadian telecommunications firms means that the 
dangers associated with non-neutrality are both seri-
ous and possibly imminent. 59 Indeed, as noted above, 
it was a Canadian telecommunications carrier and 
ISP (Telus) who provoked one of the earliest recorded 
net neutrality disputes, when it prevent its subscribers 
from accessing the Web site of the trade union repre-
senting its own workers during an industrial dispute. 60 
Although this was resolved with haste, subsequent 
events in Canada have provoked a discussion of pos-
sible policy responses, despite initial skepticism that 
the issue was one for government at all. Documents 
disclosed under freedom of information law show 
how Industry Canada supported a “market forces” 
approach and advised the Minister against supporting 
a policy response. 61 
 The CRTC issued a forbearance order relating 
to ISPs in 1999 (following its New Media report that 
also led to a New Media Exemption Order exempting 
“Internet broadcasting” from regulation for the time 
being), and does not regulate the rates charged to 
 customers—although it does retain the ability to act 
against unjust discrimination and undue preference 
under the Telecommunications Act. In the  Perspectives 
report, 62 a review of developments since the 1999 
new media orders, the interaction between this state 
of affairs and ISP behavior was summarized, noting 
“increased discussion, research and regulatory investiga-
tion” into the actions of ISPs, and not just in Canada. 
 Indeed, in 2008 the Canadian Association 
of Internet Providers (CAIP), representing non-
 incumbent ISPs, urged the CRTC to prevent Bell 
Canada from traffic shaping/throttling. This refers to 
Bell’s actions in identifying peer-to-peer traffic during 
certain hours of the day and lowering the priority 
given to such packets across its network—not unlike 
Virgin’s position mentioned above. The motivation 
for the CAIP complaint was that their member ISPs 
buy Internet access (wholesale) from Bell for resale to 
their own customers and thus they were in practice 
required to sell Bell policies despite disagreement 
with or consumer complaints about such. 63 This was 
a relatively limited set of proceedings, not capable 
of dealing with all issues due to the specific nature 
of the complaint and the necessary restrictions that 
such entails, and the CRTC ultimately dismissed 
the complaint in November 2008. 64 However, in a 
June speech, the chair of the CRTC referred to these 
proceedings and suggested that a broader consultation 
on net neutrality was an option before it, 65 and this 
consultation was launched on the same day that the 
CAIP/Bell decision was announced. 66 ISPs, though, 
continued to insist, in the context of the regula-
tion of new media, that they play a “passive role” in 
delivering new media content. In its 2009 statement 
on net neutrality, the CRTC set out a number of 
principles, taking different approaches to wholesale 
and consumer services and deferring a final decision 
(which was ultimately the same decision in sub-
stance) regarding mobile networks to a later date. 67 
As in Europe, emphasis was put on transparency and 
the provision of information to consumers, while also 
avoiding any forthright criticism of the principles of 
traffic management per se.  
 How these issues developed is of quite some 
importance to Canadian media regulation. The high-
bandwidth content that acts as a trigger for certain 
net neutrality issues often is, by its nature, the 
same type of content that was recognized in the 
New Media Exemption Order as coming under the 
statutory definition of broadcasting and resembles, 
replaces, or competes with fully regulated TV and 
radio services. In the United Kingdom, the BBC’s 
wildly popular iPlayer service (allowing UK users to 
view and download (with restrictions) TV programs 
already broadcast) has prompted ISPs to issue state-
ments of concern over the burden it places on their 
networks; 68 the CBC in Canada has already experi-
mented with some peer-to-peer distribution. Indeed, 
the issue already has been aired in the context of 
the CRTC’s review of new media, with content 
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creators  expressing concern that ISP traffic manage-
ment would limit the development of Canadian new 
media content accessed via the Internet, 69 and, to 
the surprise of some observers and over the dissent 
of Conservative members, the House of Commons 
committee charged with reviewing the CBC included 
a discussion and strong recommendations in favor of 
net neutrality (in the context of public broadcasting) 
in its February 2008 report. 
 Suggestions had been circulated, notably in 
reports on new media prepared before the 2009 
review of the Exemption Order, that ISPs should be 
required to make a contribution to the development 
of Canadian content. 70 This is in some ways a tradi-
tional Canadian approach, with many participants in 
the communications industries having been required 
to make payments to “talent” funds throughout the 
history of Canadian broadcasting. Assuming that this 
approach is workable and that there is political will to 
pursue it, it does suggest that there may be a potential 
for a negotiation of a range of issues, including contri-
butions, network neutrality and visibility of or access 
to Canadian content, as part of an holistic response.  
 The challenge faced by proponents of this 
approach was underlined by the submission of the 
Canadian ISP Association, who reminded the 
CRTC that “it is important for the Commission 
to recognize and understand that it does not have 
the authority under the Broadcasting Act or the 
Telecommunications Act to impose such a contribu-
tion regime on ISPs in furtherance of the broadcasting 
policy objectives.” The CRTC frequently  dismisses 
such challenges with ease, as it did in the case of BDU 
carriage fees for over-the-air television 71 and has been 
at pains to avoid suggesting any limit to its jurisdic-
tion over providers of Internet “Broadcasting Act 
content” throughout its engagement with new media. 
However, the CRTC decided in 2009 to seek a firm 
answer to the question, asking the Federal Court of 
Appeal to determine the status of ISPs for the purpose 
of broadcasting and telecommunications legislation. 
The Court, while not dealing with some broader 
issues such as the exact definition of broadcasting in 
the context of the Internet, ruled that ISPs providing 
an Internet connection to end users are not within 
the scope of the Broadcasting Act. 72 This restricts the 
flexibility of the CRTC in terms of its broadcasting 
and new media regulatory agenda, but also underlines 
the relationship between this issue and net neutrality, 
with the Court relying (at paragraph 59) upon the 
neutrality of the ISPs as a factor weighing against 
regulation through the Act. 
 LESSONS FROM THE NET 
NEUTRALITY DEBATES 
 In Europe, organizations representing the inter-
ests of content providers are guarding against “regula-
tion,” on the grounds that it would stifle the growth 
of Web media. In the United States, similar organiza-
tions are petitioning Congress and the FCC for “regu-
lation,” on the ground that failing to regulate will 
allow some service providers and telecommunications 
corporations to stifle the growth of Web media. In 
Canada, the challenge is to connect the various dots 
in a fashion that recognizes the distinctive features of 
the Canadian broadcasting and telecommunications 
systems and is in line with the accepted principles of 
freedom of expression. In all cases, though, those with 
various perspectives must surely begin to realize that 
“medium regulation” is what net neutrality legislation 
actually is. Therefore, situating the various proposals 
to regulate (or to self-regulate, or to regulate through 
architecture, or any other form of regulation) in the 
context of features of cyberlaw like the role of infor-
mation, the connection between law and computer 
science, and the importance of media and cultural 
studies to the development of the law of the Internet, 
is a helpful approach.  
 An essay by Hyde 73 on the similarities between 
18th Century US controversies on preachers and 
pulpits is a timely reminder that the issue of net 
neutrality is not one that should be the sole business 
of a small group of Internet activists and lobbyists. 
It is necessary to acknowledge that, while increas-
ingly vehement disagreements between economists 
on how to stimulate the development of broadband 
in the United States are undoubtedly important, a 
broader conversation on the cultural and political 
impact of new technologies is slowly emerging from 
the confusion that is net neutrality. There is some-
thing poignant about Benjamin Franklin’s idea, cited 
by Hyde, that a privately-funded lecture hall would 
“accommodate ... the Inhabitants in general.” It is 
a simple and elegant notion of public service that 
can exist in any organizational or regulatory context; 
an ethos that accommodates the contradictory and 
puzzling whims of the community is, after all, the 
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ultimate in  (corporate) social responsibility. Yet there 
also is a strong similarity between the decisions of the 
debate-favoring friends of Franklin and the millions 
of hours spent by developers, programmers, mod-
erators, designers, bloggers, and more in building a 
vibrant, chaotic, and global Internet, including vari-
ous forms of expression. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that there has been significant popular participation 
on the “pro-neutrality” side, and less so on the oppo-
site side. 
 On the other hand, it is not accurate to argue 
that ISPs and content providers/platforms are dia-
metrically opposed. The reaction to the apparent 
agreement (on some points) between Verizon and 
Google (as examples of the former and latter respec-
tively) was one of surprise, betrayal, and no small 
measure of cynicism. Those supporting net neutrality 
are disappointed that Google may be a less reliable 
“ally” than they would have assumed. It should not 
have come as a huge surprise, though. While for those 
who support a statutory or regulatory basis for net 
neutrality, the support of the content industry is wel-
come (particularly from a tactical point of view), the 
question of the control of content, expression, and 
innovation by culturally significant (and in certain 
cases, essentially hegemonic) businesses in the areas 
of social networking, search, and user-generated con-
tent would still be on the table. This is not to suggest 
that Google has done anything illegitimate, but that 
the interests of Google are not necessarily synony-
mous with the interests of organizations that Google 
may support for a particular period. Net neutrality is 
part of a spectrum of issues relating to media, speech, 
and freedom. Indeed, “divided sovereignty” itself, as 
cited with approval by Hyde, is surely threatened 
when users must play by the rules of the platform if 
they wish to interact with their “friends” who have all 
joined it. Kang and Pasquale (separately) add that it 
is necessary to prevent a debate on network neutrality 
becoming solely an economic one, as even the limited 
problems encountered to date cannot all be classified 
as economically related. In particular, principles of 
anti-discrimination law can assist the student of net-
work neutrality, as can studies of the cultural impact 
of media consolidation. 74 
 Lessig argued in  The Future of Ideas 75 that cable 
ISPs (not having common carrier obligations) would 
be able to discriminate, such as by making video 
streaming difficult (a particularly relevant fear for 
our purposes). He argues that that older approaches 
in communications law (such as those favoring the 
freedom to connect devices to the telephone net-
work, as in the  Carterfone decision) assisted in the 
development of the Internet, and thus there could be 
negative consequences for Internet development if 
such discrimination was put in place. (Subsequently, 
Zittrain’s more detailed work on generativity consid-
ers the connections between restrictions on the use of 
a system or network and the ability to use it for new 
and innovative purposes). 76 
 “Four freedoms” were set out in a 2004 speech by 
the then-chair of the FCC, Michael Powell, freedom 
to access content, use applications, attach devices and 
obtain service information. A subsequent policy state-
ment, the Internet Policy Statement, 77 restates them 
though with significant caveats attached, so for exam-
ple, the third point is now phrased as an entitlement to 
connect “legal devices that do not harm the network” 
and a chapeau-like restriction of the principles being 
subject to reasonable network management. Now, the 
formal adoption of these principles, alongside others 
(most notably non-discrimination), forms part of FCC 
rule-making, although with a bright line between fixed 
and mobile services (another point touched on in the 
Verizon/Google statement) proving divisive. 78 This 
process began before the FCC’s defeat in the Comcast 
appeal, but has gained new urgency (for proponents of 
net neutrality) since then, as the current status of the 
Policy Statement appears very weak. 
 The Commission first found itself dealing with 
the interpretation of the original statement, in its 
first response to the complaint against Comcast, 
which was not a comprehensive net neutrality issue, 
but an important illustration of the issue. 79 The 
activities criticized in these proceedings were the 
restrictions on the use of peer-to-peer services (spe-
cifically, BitTorrent) through intentional (but some-
what secretive) degradation of quality, which had 
been established by various observers, including 
the Associated Press. 80 Again, we see some things 
in common with the behavior of Virgin and Bell 
Canada discussed above. After a vigorous investiga-
tion, including widely-discussed public proceedings, 
the Commission found against Comcast, although 
the statement does seem to approve of certain block-
ing activities “consistent with federal policy,” such in 
the case of “illegal content … or transmissions that 
violate copyright law.” 81 This is not a full-throated 
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endorsement of Internet freedom, lest any confu-
sion be caused. However, the case, welcomed by 
pro- neutrality campaigners as an “historic victory” 82 
should be seen as an important one, not just because 
of its consequences for Comcast, but also how it made 
use of the earlier policy statement and suggested that 
the Commission was moving towards a formal regula-
tory approach.  
 In turn, Comcast challenged the decision in fed-
eral court, and won an important victory, not strictly 
on the grounds of any substantive objection to the 
decision, but instead the legal basis (ancillary juris-
diction) on which the Commission acted. How the 
matter is ultimately disposed of—whether through 
judicial determination, the FCC’s December 2010 
order, or new legislation—will be an important stage 
in the development of US policy towards the type of 
Internet that federal law will prioritize, and should 
have an impact on the ongoing European Union and 
Canadian proceedings, each of which have been and 
continue to be influenced by developments in the 
United States. The additional dimension in both 
Europe and Canada is the interaction between tele-
communications regulation, Internet policy and the 
reform of broadcasting law, but the rapid development 
of the regulator’s role in the United States and the 
ongoing articulation of the speech-related critique of 
the gatekeeper role can encourage lawmakers outside 
the United States to go beyond a debate on transpar-
ency or indeed competition. 
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